Majority rule in the absence of a majority
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Publication:2324800
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.006zbMath1422.91226OpenAlexW2159316326WikidataQ127756835 ScholiaQ127756835MaRDI QIDQ2324800
Publication date: 12 September 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.006
Related Items (6)
The median rule in judgement aggregation ⋮ Local supermajorities ⋮ A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties ⋮ Weighted representative democracy ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation
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