Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01182-wzbMath1425.91148OpenAlexW2921684126WikidataQ128184631 ScholiaQ128184631MaRDI QIDQ2325657

María del Pino Ramos-Sosa, Bernardo Moreno, Ismael Rodríguez-Lara

Publication date: 27 September 2019

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers19_04.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsvoting rulesconformitybinary-decision voting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
• Nonparametric tests of differences in medians: Comparison of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and robust rank-order tests
• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• Herding, social preferences and (non-)conformity
• Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Conformity in voting
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

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