Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
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Publication:2325657
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01182-wzbMath1425.91148OpenAlexW2921684126WikidataQ128184631 ScholiaQ128184631MaRDI QIDQ2325657
María del Pino Ramos-Sosa, Bernardo Moreno, Ismael Rodríguez-Lara
Publication date: 27 September 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers19_04.pdf
Uses Software
Cites Work
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