Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology

DOI10.1007/s00712-018-0613-5zbMath1425.91165OpenAlexW2601911345MaRDI QIDQ2326170

Michael Eichenseer, Wolfgang Buchholz

Publication date: 7 October 2019

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6352.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsleadershipclimate policychoice of technology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Is technological progress Pareto-improving for a world with global public goods?
• Public goods, growth, and welfare
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology
• On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations

This page was built for publication: Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology