Apportioning indivisible damage and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology
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Publication:2326171
DOI10.1007/s00712-018-0610-8zbMath1425.91353OpenAlexW2811507493MaRDI QIDQ2326171
Publication date: 7 October 2019
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-018-0610-8
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law
- Transboundary pollution and the welfare effects of technology transfer
- Incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level: An evaluation of policy alternatives
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Local content and emission taxes when the number of foreign firms is endogenous
- Permits, standards, and technology innovation
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations
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