Comparing welfare and profit in quantity and price competition within Stackelberg mixed duopolies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2326174
DOI10.1007/S00712-018-0603-7zbMath1425.91278OpenAlexW2607104220MaRDI QIDQ2326174
Toshihiro Matsumura, Kosuke Hirose
Publication date: 7 October 2019
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/77700/1/MPRA_paper_77700.pdf
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (3)
Product differentiation, privatization commitment and profitability comparisons ⋮ Stackelberg population dynamics: a predictive-sensitivity approach ⋮ Dynamics and stability analysis of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in insurance market
Cites Work
- Price or quantity? The strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly
- Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy
- Undesirable competition
- What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?
- Comparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed markets
- On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach
- An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications
- Partial privatization in an exhaustible resource industry
- Privatization and efficiency: a mixed oligopoly approach
- Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition
- Advertising competition in a mixed oligopoly
- Choosing price or quantity? The role of delegation and network externalities
This page was built for publication: Comparing welfare and profit in quantity and price competition within Stackelberg mixed duopolies
