The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028zbMath1422.91557arXiv1810.10287OpenAlexW2896639702WikidataQ60781772 ScholiaQ60781772MaRDI QIDQ2328512

Josué Ortega

Publication date: 10 October 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.10287

zbMATH Keywords

social integrationassignment schemeslarge matching marketsreplica economiesspouse ranking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Gainers and losers from market integration ⋮ On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets ⋮ Equality of opportunity and integration in social networks ⋮ Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences ⋮ The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

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