NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2329150
DOI10.1007/s11238-019-09701-yzbMath1426.91024OpenAlexW2936184115MaRDI QIDQ2329150
Publication date: 17 October 2019
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09701-y
Related Items (2)
Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure ⋮ Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Cooperative equilibria of finite games with incomplete information
- The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players
- On the nonemptiness of the \(\alpha\)-core of discontinuous games: transferable and nontransferable utilities
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- The existence of TU \(\alpha\)-core in normal form games
- Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
- On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players
- Alpha cores of games with nonatomic asymmetric information
- Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
- The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
- Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
- On the existence of strong Nash equilibria
- An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
- Stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibria and Pareto-Nash equilibria for multiobjective population games
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Introduction to game theory
This page was built for publication: NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
