Strategic communication with reporting costs

DOI10.1007/s11238-019-09709-4zbMath1426.91064OpenAlexW3125104120WikidataQ127790959 ScholiaQ127790959MaRDI QIDQ2329164

Winand Emons, Claude Fluet

Publication date: 17 October 2019

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://boris.unibe.ch/138530/8/Strategic%20Communication_Jan_2016.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

persuasiondisclosureactive judgingadversarialinquisitorial

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Competition in costly talk

Cites Work

• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Persuasion with communication costs
• Competition in Persuasion
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

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