Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

DOI10.1007/s00182-019-00659-3zbMath1426.91100OpenAlexW2527003674MaRDI QIDQ2329410

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 17 October 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00659-3

zbMATH Keywords

valencecandidateselectoral gamedistribution of ideal pointselectoral equilibriumrank objectives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Political competition between differentiated candidates
• Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
• On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
• On the existence of a fixed-number equilibrium in a multiparty electoral system
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
• Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry
• Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
• Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information

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