A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.001zbMath1426.91200OpenAlexW2803252453WikidataQ128581143 ScholiaQ128581143MaRDI QIDQ2329696

Joseph M. Abdou, Hans Keiding

Publication date: 18 October 2019

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

conflict resolutionpolitical compromise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

Political structures and the topology of simplicial complexes

Cites Work

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• Power and Taxes

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