Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.02.001zbMath1426.91102OpenAlexW2911880381MaRDI QIDQ2329697

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 18 October 2019

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumpartial jurywinner of competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
• Picking the winners
• A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: an impossibility and some proposals
• Impartial Nominations for a Prize
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Toward Natural Implementation
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

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