Optimal crowdfunding design
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Publication:2334128
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104939zbMath1426.91295OpenAlexW3122438686WikidataQ127299918 ScholiaQ127299918MaRDI QIDQ2334128
Publication date: 7 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/201925
Related Items (6)
A cash‐strapped creator's reward‐based crowdfunding strategies with spot sales ⋮ Optimal initial coin offering under speculative token trading ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Information design and capital formation ⋮ Optimal crowdfunding design ⋮ A Global Game Model of Medical Project Crowdfunding
Cites Work
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- Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
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