Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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Publication:2334138
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104948zbMath1426.91177OpenAlexW2979761870MaRDI QIDQ2334138
Bettina Klaus, Mehmet Karakaya, Jan Christoph Schlegel
Publication date: 7 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104948
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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