Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104950zbMath1426.91176OpenAlexW2980103087WikidataQ127108760 ScholiaQ127108760MaRDI QIDQ2334139

Taro Kumano, Aytek Erdil

Publication date: 7 November 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/297818

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencymatching with indifferencessubstitutable priorities with ties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities

Cites Work

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• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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