A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108747zbMath1425.91280OpenAlexW2978086122WikidataQ127173078 ScholiaQ127173078MaRDI QIDQ2334328

Panfei Sun, Gen-Jiu Xu, Qianqian Kong, Hao Sun

Publication date: 7 November 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108747

zbMATH Keywords

corelimitexternalitiesequal division solutionBetrand oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• N‐person games in partition function form