Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108751zbMath1425.91200OpenAlexW2979511186WikidataQ127104760 ScholiaQ127104760MaRDI QIDQ2334330

Yong Liu, Shu-Lin Liu

Publication date: 7 November 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108751

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionall-pay auctionsreimbursement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Manipulation of moves in sequential contests

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Sad-loser contests
• Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
• Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
• Manipulations in contests
• Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times

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