The modified Boston mechanism
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Publication:2334829
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.004zbMath1426.91174OpenAlexW2896932697MaRDI QIDQ2334829
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.004
Related Items (16)
Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited ⋮ Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study ⋮ Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents ⋮ Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis ⋮ Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information ⋮ Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ Obvious manipulations ⋮ School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms ⋮ School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected? ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem ⋮ Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
Cites Work
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- School choice: an experimental study
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
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