Dictatorship versus manipulability

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.07.001zbMath1426.91103OpenAlexW2907268674WikidataQ127457635 ScholiaQ127457635MaRDI QIDQ2334835

Dezső Bednay, Attila Tasnádi, Anna Moskalenko

Publication date: 8 November 2019

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/3845/1/cewp_201809.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityGibbard-Satterthwaite theoremdictatorshipsocial choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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