Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
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Publication:2334861
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.001zbMath1426.91007arXiv1707.05619OpenAlexW2962767360MaRDI QIDQ2334861
Umberto Grandi, Francesca Rossi, Daniel Hughes, Arkadii M. Slinko
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.05619
Related Items (5)
Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting ⋮ On the safety of group manipulation ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting ⋮ Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model ⋮ When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
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