An oligopoly-fringe non-renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2019.05.014zbMath1425.91350OpenAlexW2947498776WikidataQ127768581 ScholiaQ127768581MaRDI QIDQ2338382
Hassan Benchekroun, Gerard van der Meijden, Cees A. A. M. Withagen
Publication date: 21 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/8ffc1aa5-4709-46e1-bbb3-2c58c3a9ca0d
Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (2)
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