Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow's single-peakedness

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.08.001zbMath1471.91133OpenAlexW2968243831WikidataQ127358082 ScholiaQ127358082MaRDI QIDQ2338669

Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 21 November 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingtransitivitymedian graphsCondorcet domainssingle-peaked property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions ⋮ A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ Structure of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Towards a classification of maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey ⋮ Constructing large peak-pit Condorcet domains

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• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Total Ordering Problem
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions

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