Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
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Publication:2338670
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.010zbMath1427.91146OpenAlexW2577786755WikidataQ127356655 ScholiaQ127356655MaRDI QIDQ2338670
Publication date: 21 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1860
sd-efficiencyequal treatment of equalssd-envy-freenesssd-strategy-proofnessprobabilistic serial rulerestricted tier domains
Related Items (7)
Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ Structure of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Random assignments of bundles ⋮ Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey
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