Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game

DOI10.1007/s10479-014-1698-zzbMath1315.91013OpenAlexW2047431778MaRDI QIDQ2341202

Ralf Borndörfer, Nam Dũng Hoàng

Publication date: 23 April 2015

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z

zbMATH Keywords

\((f,r)\)-least core\(f\)-nucleolusconstrained cost allocation gamesfair ticket prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Integer programming (90C10) Cooperative games (91A12) Linear programming (90C05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
• The general nucleolus and the reduced game property
• The traveling salesman game: An application of cost allocation in a gas and oil company
• Note on the computational complexity of least core concepts for min-cost spanning tree games.
• Models for fare planning in public transport
• Exploring relaxation induced neighborhoods to improve MIP solutions
• Computing the nucleolus when the characteristic function is given implicitly: A constraint generation approach
• Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power

This page was built for publication: Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game