Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.011zbMath1310.91059OpenAlexW2033197308MaRDI QIDQ2343313

Johanna M. M. Goertz, François Maniquet

Publication date: 5 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.011

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationCondorcet jury theoremlarge Poisson games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting ⋮ A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives ⋮ Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Cites Work

• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Large Poisson games
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

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