A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.08.018zbMath1310.91027arXiv1408.1022OpenAlexW2026201994MaRDI QIDQ2343324

Gaurab Aryal, Ronald Stauber

Publication date: 5 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.1022

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitymaxmindynamic consistencyextensive games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (5)

Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors ⋮ Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players ⋮ Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games ⋮ Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games ⋮ On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems

Cites Work

• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
• Ellsberg games
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
• Recursive multiple-priors.
• Game Theory
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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