The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.08.025zbMath1310.91052OpenAlexW2132120876MaRDI QIDQ2343329

Gerhard Riener, Christian Kellner

Publication date: 5 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59000

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversioncontract designEllsberg urncomparative compensation schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

The statistical properties of the threshold model and the feedback leadership condition ⋮ Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts ⋮ Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

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