Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.006zbMath1318.91033OpenAlexW2172270964MaRDI QIDQ2343386

Thomas W. L. Norman

Publication date: 5 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

learninghypothesis testingrational-expectations equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ On endogenous formation of price expectations

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