Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
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Publication:2343388
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.006zbMath1318.91131OpenAlexW2020602744MaRDI QIDQ2343388
Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/102385/1/102385.pdf
Related Items (11)
Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object ⋮ On the number of employed in the matching model ⋮ Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain ⋮ Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem ⋮ Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial ⋮ A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
Cites Work
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- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
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- Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
- Finding large stable matchings
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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