Committees with leaks

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.02.012zbMath1318.91047OpenAlexW3123855651MaRDI QIDQ2343395

Jaideep Roy, Saptarshi P. Ghosh

Publication date: 5 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.012

zbMATH Keywords

welfarecareer concernsinformative votingleakage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (1)

Committee design with endogenous participation

Cites Work

• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Professional advice
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Is Transparency To No Avail?*
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

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