The recursive core for non-superadditive games

DOI10.3390/g1020066zbMath1311.91018OpenAlexW2041990537MaRDI QIDQ2344928

Chen-Ying Huang, Tomas Sjöström

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020066

zbMATH Keywords

partition functioncoalition formationrecursive corenoncooperative implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games ⋮ A substitute for the classical Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function in cooperative differential games ⋮ STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES

Cites Work

• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
• Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Order independent equilibria
• Divide-and-permute
• Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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