Coalition formation among farsighted agents
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Publication:2344941
DOI10.3390/g1030286zbMath1311.91017OpenAlexW2098844716MaRDI QIDQ2344941
Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030286
Related Items (11)
Farsightedly stable tariffs ⋮ Social rationalizability with mediation ⋮ Coalition formation under dominance invariance ⋮ Subgame perfect coalition formation ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players ⋮ Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES ⋮ Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets ⋮ Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation
Cites Work
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- A model of agreements in strategic form games
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
- Strongly stable networks
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
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