Consistent beliefs in extensive form games

DOI10.3390/g1040415zbMath1311.91022OpenAlexW1979461288MaRDI QIDQ2344951

Paulo Barelli

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040415

zbMATH Keywords

common beliefepistemic conditionscorrelated subgame perfect equilibriumhierarchies of conditional beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

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