Spite and reciprocity in auctions
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Publication:2344987
DOI10.3390/G2030365zbMath1311.91121OpenAlexW2000416065MaRDI QIDQ2344987
Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Timothy N. Cason, Naoko Nishimura, Yoshikazu Ikeda
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g2030365
experimentreciprocityEnglish auctionsocial preferencesspitedominant strategysecond price auctionascending-bid auction
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (7)
An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Acts of helping and harming ⋮ Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation ⋮ Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values ⋮ An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions ⋮ The spite motive in third price auctions ⋮ Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
Cites Work
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- A theory of reciprocity
- An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
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