On the optimality of not allocating

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016zbMath1311.91115OpenAlexW2013752433MaRDI QIDQ2345151

Fabio Michelucci, Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-174907

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies

Cites Work

• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Unnamed Item

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