Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.001zbMath1311.91120OpenAlexW2047815293MaRDI QIDQ2345204

Ahuva Mu'alem

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationmechanism designprofit maximizationenvy-free allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
• A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
• A Deterministic Truthful PTAS for Scheduling Related Machines
• Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
• Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
• On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• A Polynomial Approximation Scheme for Scheduling on Uniform Processors: Using the Dual Approximation Approach
• Optimal Auction Design
• Exact and Approximate Algorithms for Scheduling Nonidentical Processors
• Scheduling independent tasks to reduce mean finishing time
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Algorithmic mechanism design

This page was built for publication: Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms