Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.002zbMath1311.91097OpenAlexW2889943118MaRDI QIDQ2345206

Sébastien Turban, Alessandra Casella

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18573.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingvotingcompetitive equilibriumvote tradingmarkets for votes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Strategic vote trading under complete information ⋮ Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

Cites Work

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• A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
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• Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
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• The central limit theorem for dependent random variables
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• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• All-Pay Contests
• Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining

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