Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.012zbMath1311.91014OpenAlexW3124507439MaRDI QIDQ2345228

Francis Bloch, Anne van den Nouweland

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

coreaxiomatizationpartition function gamesexpectation formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (22)

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core ⋮ On convexity in cooperative games with externalities ⋮ Core existence in vertically differentiated markets ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game ⋮ On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Consistency and the core in games with externalities ⋮ Marginality and convexity in partition function form games ⋮ Games in sequencing situations with externalities ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities ⋮ Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms ⋮ Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility ⋮ Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form ⋮ Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach ⋮ Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities ⋮ The core in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies ⋮ A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Externalities, potential, value and consistency
• Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Values of games in partition function form
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Farsighted stability in hedonic games
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
• N‐person games in partition function form

This page was built for publication: Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games