Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
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Publication:2345232
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.001zbMath1311.91079OpenAlexW3121308463WikidataQ55881416 ScholiaQ55881416MaRDI QIDQ2345232
Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.001
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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