The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.10.026zbMath1311.91118OpenAlexW2060162818MaRDI QIDQ2345264

Xuyuan Liu, Jingfeng Lu

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.026

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctiongrand contestsplit contestsubcontestvirtual effort of efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• Contest architecture
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design

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