Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences

DOI10.3390/g5040204zbMath1314.91106OpenAlexW1964447443MaRDI QIDQ2346947

Richard F. Potthoff

Publication date: 26 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040204

zbMATH Keywords

mathematical inductionstrategic votingapproval votingCondorcet completion methodscyclical majoritiesmanipulable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Geometry of voting
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

This page was built for publication: Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences