Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

DOI10.3390/G5040234zbMath1314.91076OpenAlexW2155773125MaRDI QIDQ2346949

Denise Lovett, Edward J. P. Cartwright

Publication date: 26 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040234

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityconditional cooperationpublic goodleadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Cooperation of pairs ⋮ Conditional cooperation and framing effects ⋮ Conditional cooperation: type stability across games

Cites Work

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• `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
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• A theory of reciprocity
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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