Interim partially correlated rationalizability

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.012zbMath1318.91017OpenAlexW1999887083MaRDI QIDQ2347767

Qianfeng Tang

Publication date: 8 June 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26810/1/MPRA_paper_26810.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitygames with incomplete informationhierarchies of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution

Cites Work

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