Plausible cooperation
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Publication:2347768
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.010zbMath1318.91028OpenAlexW4243985003MaRDI QIDQ2347768
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.010
Related Items (4)
Bad reputation with simple rating systems ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world ⋮ Plausible cooperation
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