Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2015.01.041zbMath1315.05064OpenAlexW2118920912MaRDI QIDQ2348052

Felix Brandt, Andre Dau, Hans Georg Seedig

Publication date: 10 June 2015

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.01.041

zbMATH Keywords

disparitydisjointnesstournament solutionsminimal examples

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20)

Related Items (4)

Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ Improved bounds for minimal feedback vertex sets in tournaments ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions

Uses Software

• nauty
• Gurobi

Cites Work

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