The iterated hawk-dove game revisited: the effect of ownership uncertainty on bourgeois as a pure convention

DOI10.1007/S13235-014-0111-5zbMath1314.91034OpenAlexW2067391277MaRDI QIDQ2348565

Tom N. Sherratt, Mike Mesterton-Gibbons, Tugba Karabiyik

Publication date: 15 June 2015

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0111-5

zbMATH Keywords

animal conflictresource-holding potentialevolution of private property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (4)

Chris Cannings: a life in games ⋮ How residency duration affects the outcome of a territorial contest: complementary game-theoretic models ⋮ Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions ⋮ Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated hawk-dove game

Cites Work

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• Asymmetric population games and the legacy of Maynard Smith: From evolution to game theory and back?
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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