Dominance hierarchies induce a population's full cooperation

DOI10.1007/s13235-014-0126-yzbMath1314.91038OpenAlexW2058159134MaRDI QIDQ2348566

Jingjing Xu, Yi Tao, Ross Cressman, Cong Li

Publication date: 15 June 2015

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0126-y

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationdominance hierarchyasymmetric interactiondefection costinduced cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Strong migration limit for games in structured populations: applications to dominance hierarchy and set structure ⋮ Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population

Cites Work

• Information, variance and cooperation: minimal models
• Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
• Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
• Hamilton's missing link
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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