Stable sets in majority pillage games

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0440-zzbMath1388.91026OpenAlexW2047284067MaRDI QIDQ2349421

David Obadia, James S. Jordan

Publication date: 22 June 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0440-z

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoalitional gamesallocation by forcepillage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Power and efficiency in production pillage games ⋮ Fair stable sets of simple games ⋮ Pillage games with multiple stable sets ⋮ Asymmetric majority pillage games ⋮ The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information ⋮ Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games ⋮ Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics

Cites Work

• Pillage and property
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
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