Institutional inertia and institutional change in an expanding normal-form game

DOI10.3390/g4030398zbMath1314.91064OpenAlexW2091262003WikidataQ121410673 ScholiaQ121410673MaRDI QIDQ2351238

Torsten Heinrich, Henning Schwardt

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030398

zbMATH Keywords

simulationevolutionary game theoryinstitutional changeinstitutional economicsVeblenian economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games: some simulation results ⋮ An agent-based model of institutional life-cycles

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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