The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings

DOI10.3390/g4040690zbMath1314.91121OpenAlexW1987957323MaRDI QIDQ2351253

Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040690

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencyincentive compatibilitybudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case ⋮ Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities

Cites Work

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• Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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