The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
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Publication:2351253
DOI10.3390/g4040690zbMath1314.91121OpenAlexW1987957323MaRDI QIDQ2351253
Publication date: 23 June 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040690
Related Items (5)
Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case ⋮ Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
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