External pressure on alliances: what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal?

DOI10.3390/G4040754zbMath1314.91153OpenAlexW2084204541MaRDI QIDQ2351258

Jane M. Binner, Francesco Ciardiello, Vassili N. Kolokol'tsov, Leslie R. Fletcher

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040754

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymathematical modelprisoners' dilemmabusiness alliances

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Weight of fitness deviation governs strict physical chaos in replicator dynamics

Cites Work

• Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Unnamed Item

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